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Introduction 
The goals of market design include, as a pre-condition of continued popular and therefore 
political support, confidence in security of high quality supply at sustainably competitive 
prices.  Sustainability here refers both to the ability of the sector to finance and deliver 
efficient and reliable electricity supply and in the environmental sense of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. Efficiency requires that energy, capacity and ancillary services are 
at least cost but at prices that allow adequate investment to be financed by the private sector. 
This in turn requires that the markets provide price signals for entry of new generating 
capacity that is efficient in location, timing, scale and fuel choice, and for dispatch that 
minimises social costs, including environmental costs. Market integration in turn means that 
European costs are minimised, trade takes place guided by comparative advantage, importing 
competition into more concentrated markets.  
Before 1990, almost every electricity supply industry was vertically integrated with a 
captive franchise market, either state-owned (the majority case) or under regulated private 
ownership (particularly in the US, but also in Germany). In both cases the form of regulation 
was effectively cost-of-service regulation.2 Electricity liberalisation starts from the premise 
that while transmission and distribution networks are natural monopolies requiring 
regulation, generation and supply (or retailing) are potentially competitive activities. 
Effective competition is superior to regulation in providing incentives for efficiency that are 
then passed on to consumers in lower prices. Vertical unbundling also allows for incentive 
regulation (such as Britain’s price-cap regulation) of transmission and distribution networks 
and offers the prospect of greater efficiency than traditional cost-of-service regulation. 
Although electricity networks were typically synchronised over wide areas (e.g. over most of 
Western Europe under the UCTE (Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of 
Electricity), and within the three synchronised networks that cover the US), trade across the 
borders of areas under different transmission system operators (TSOs) were mostly guided by 
security rather than economic considerations. Competition and trade are obvious 
                                                 
1  This paper draws directly on the papers presented at the Cambridge SESSA, cited in the references. 
I am indebted to Ignacio Perez Arriaga and Jean-Michel Glachant, as well as other participants, for 
their helpful comments. 
2 In the US before 1973, rapid technical progress and stable fuel costs combined with regulatory lags 
provided similar incentives for efficiency gains as price-cap regulation. 
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handmaidens, so improving cross-border electricity trade offers additional prospective 
efficiency gains.3 
 
The challenge facing liberalisation 
Electricity differs from standard commodities in important respects, in that it cannot be stored 
economically (except as water in a hydro system) and supply and demand must be 
instantaneously balanced by a system operator (another natural monopoly function). In 
addition, demand is typically very inelastic in the short run, with a large fraction of 
consumers not able to face or respond to spot or scarcity prices, and from whom supply 
cannot be withheld. Power lines must be operated within their limited capacity, and if quality 
parameters (frequency, voltage, phase angle) move outside tight limits, cascading power cuts 
may result. Power stations are capital intensive (typically average total costs can be twice 
variable cost), lumpy and durable (30-50 years), often requiring considerable lead times to 
secure planning permission and complete construction.4 In short, managing an interconnected 
electricity system presents considerable challenges that have in the past argued against using 
decentralised market mechanisms to deliver power and guide operation and investment 
decisions. 
 
Liberalisation – the process begins 
Serious electricity liberalisation in OECD countries started with Britain’s restructuring and 
privatisation of 1990, demonstrating that unbundling and creating wholesale electricity 
markets was feasible. In the US, liberalisation started after the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 
and more decisively after California started exploring liberalisation options from April 1994 
(Joskow, 2004). After the British experience, and liberalisation in Norway in 1991 (not to 
mention Chile, Argentina, New Zealand and Australia), the European Commission decided to 
introduce Directives to open up the European energy markets (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). The 
Electricity Directive published in 1996 forced the pace in a number of countries that until the 
Directive had not actively pursued liberalisation (e.g. the Netherlands, see van Damme 2005). 
The design of reform remained very much up to individual jurisdictions until 2003 when the 
next Electricity Directive and FERC’s Standard Market Design attempted to prescribe best 
practice market design and facilitate more efficient cross-border trade. 
The process of reform has varied widely across the EU and US, and offers the 
prospect of learning from the various experiences. To that end, SESSA Work Package 2 
commissioned papers from leading energy economists for a conference, Refining Market 
Design, held in Cambridge, England, on 14-15 July 2004. The objective was to examine the 
performance of different electricity market designs in various European countries and the US. 
This chapter first reviews the evidence provided in those papers on lessons for good market 
                                                 
3  The challenges involved in realising these gains and the options for improving cross-border trade 
are the subject of a special issue of Utilities Policy published in 2005. A list of acronyms is given at 
the end of this chapter. 
4  In all dimensions, nuclear and hydro plants are at the upper extreme, while gas-fired combined 
cycle turbines (CCGT) have relaxed most of these constraints, thus greatly favouring liberalization. 
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design (and mistakes to avoid), and then summarises these lessons in a series of prescriptions. 
Many of the original papers presented at that conference have been published in a special 
issue of The Energy Journal and will be referred to by author below. 
 
The EU: market opening and market power 
Recent EC benchmarking reports provide a useful starting point for an overview of European 
market integration. These show that the EU had already achieved (on paper at least) about 
60% market opening by 1999 (by units sold) and 90% by 2004, substantially in excess of the 
legal minima. However, in some cases, notably Germany, this apparent market opening lead 
to either relatively low levels of switching or losses by entrants and their subsequent 
withdrawal, suggesting that the market opening was more legal than actual. A better measure 
of effective market opening would be the sustainability of switching between suppliers, and 
the extent to which new suppliers were able to win market share from incumbents. 
Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) argue that the centralised approach to market liberalisation 
through the Electricity Directives has succeeded in maintaining the pace of reform in the 
original EU-15 and in a number of associated and accession countries, and in achieving a 
degree of standardisation of structures, institutions, and rules in national markets. However, 
they point to the problems created by initially concentrated market structures and the low 
level of interconnection that reduces the scope for importing competition. This initially 
concentrated market structure has been exacerbated by a large number of subsequent mergers 
that have been waved through, Real prices fell from 1997 to 2004 (but so did electricity fuel 
costs). Nevertheless, the variation in network charges and wholesale prices across the EU-15 
remains is still substantial, reflecting the scarcity of interconnection and the lack of cross-
country benchmarking for regulating network charges.5 Part of the problem lies in the 
uncompetitive nature of the gas market. If the gas market were more competitive (and 
transmission and storage charges regulated more effectively), the price of gas should be more 
uniform across Europe, as gas transmission costs are relatively low. That would mean that 
new entrants into electricity generation would face similar costs and would encourage price 
convergence. At present one must conclude that the single electricity market, in which price 
differences across space can be attributed to justified and reasonable cost differences, has not 
yet arrived. 
 
The United States: integrating disparate markets6 
The US is an excellent test-bed for ideas of market liberalisation and integration, although the 
institutional framework is very different from that of the EU, and this must be taken into 
account when drawing comparative lessons. The US and EU15 have roughly similar sized 
                                                 
5  It is not necessarily undesirable for countries and municipalities to tax transmission use, nor to take 
different views on the valuation of the partly depreciated assets, although in some cases there is 
clearly an intention to accrue company profits in the network part of the business in order to 
disadvantage competitors in the potentially competitive segments of generation and supply. 
6  This section draws heavily on Joskow (2005) and his presentations posted on the SESSA website. 
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electricity sectors: about 600 GW in the EU-15 in 2000, and 656 GW counting the accession 
countries; compared to about 650 GW in the US in 1996, 75% of which was investor owned.  
In 1995 there were about 140 separate control areas responsible for operating portions of the 
three synchronised AC networks (the Eastern, Western and Texas Interconnects), in contrast 
to the EU with its far fewer largely national control areas, also operating in three 
synchronised networks (UCPTE, the Nordic Market and Britain). Clearly this balkanisation 
in the US impeded the efficient generation and transmission of electricity, as transmission 
access was effectively negotiated, charges were pancaked (i.e. each transmission owner 
required payment), and cost of service regulation reduced the incentive to secure least-cost 
power from out of area. 
US reform really started with the Energy Policy Act of 1992, followed by California’s 
proposals of 1994 that demonstrated the need for unbundling of transmission from 
generation. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC, had a commanding role to 
play with its jurisdiction over transmission (and actions that affected electricity flows 
between states, covering most aspects of market design in the AC interconnected parts of the 
US). The importance of unbundling led to FERC’s Order 888/889 of 1996 that mandated 
regulated third party access to transmission and an Open Access Same-time Information 
System (OASIS) to facilitate trade. These supported but did not enforce moves to liberalise 
and unbundle local markets, as in California and the Northeast. Order 2000 sought to extend 
the Northeast model of Independent System Operators (ISOs) to the rest of the country, and 
for transmission owning utilities to join Regional Transmission Organisations, but made slow 
progress.  
Between 1996 and 2003 the US wholesale electricity market changed dramatically, 
compared to the previous half-century. About 100 GW of generation were divested and 
deregulated by 2003, of which 85 GW were transferred to unregulated affiliates. Between 
2000 and 2003 alone 175 GW of new generating capacity (80% merchant) were added (rising 
to 218 GW by end 2004), so that 45% of investor-owned generation was unregulated by 
2003. Real residential and industrial electricity prices continued their steady decline to 2003 
that started with the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) of 1978, even after 
controlling for fuel price changes. Bushnell and Wolfram (2005) find that fuel efficiency 
improved by about 2% in response to the improved incentives of deregulation, and that 
ownership transfers per se had little effect. 
 
Progress towards integrating markets: FERC’s Standard Market Design 
In July 2002 FERC started a new rule-making proceeding to introduce a Standard Market 
Design (SMD), based largely on the PJM model,7 with day-ahead and real time nodal pricing 
set by an Independent Transmission Provider. It placed an obligation on all Load Serving 
Entities (LSEs) to secure adequate resources (generation and transmission capacity) to meet 
their forecast demand and reserve requirements. The wholesale market would be closely 
monitored for abuses of market power and subject to $1000/MWh price cap. This cap is 
                                                 
7 originally comprising Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland, but now considerably broader. 
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supplemented by a variety of other measures, from must-run contracts, must offer provisions, 
and automatic bid mitigation procedures if an individual generating unit is attempting to 
exploit its transient market power in a temporary load pocket. The latter is potentially more 
visible and attracts more consumer concern under nodal pricing rather than in the European 
model of zonal pricing, discussed below. 
Nodal pricing involves computing the scarcity price of delivering power to or 
withdrawing power from any node, and can be computed readily if generators truthfully 
reveal their short-run marginal costs. For short-run congestion management there is 
agreement that a system relying on LMPs works and is efficient (provided that bids are 
competitive), and it is easy to extend to neighbouring dispatch areas if they also operate LMP 
and are willing to allow a single ISO to compute the nodal prices.8 The obvious problem is 
that generators may not reveal their true variable costs, hence the perceived need for 
automatic bid mitigation. 
 
Mitigating market power and ensuring capacity adequacy 
The requirement that LSEs should contract ahead for capacity reflects a concern that 
liberalised electricity markets within the US regulatory structure will fail to deliver adequate 
and timely investment, and it is important to recognise the difference between the US and the 
EU in this respect. The 1935 Energy Act continues to place a duty on regulators to ensure that 
prices are “just and reasonable”. FERC interpreted this to require liberalising jurisdictions to 
demonstrate that they had created adequately competitive wholesale markets, on the sound 
principle that competitive prices were by definition “just and reasonable”. Given the special 
characteristics of electricity, and the necessarily limited capacity of transmission systems, 
transient and possibly more enduring market power is almost inevitable in some parts of the 
network, once generators are free to bid rather than being dispatched on the basis of variable 
costs. FERC thus arguably has a duty to ensure that there are mechanisms to mitigate even 
transient market power, hence the variety of mechanisms in PJM and similar markets. The 
threat of regulatory intervention if prices rise “unreasonably” and the experience of these 
various mechanisms undermine the ability of generators to recover their fixed costs. In the 
period from 1999 to 2001 generators in the Northeast fell far short of earning sufficient 
revenue above variable costs to adequately compensate their capacity costs. 
There is thus a genuine problem in convincing investors to build new capacity (either 
base-load or peaking) if the market rules are so skewed against cost recovery, hence the need 
to require consumers (or their representatives, the LSEs) to contract ahead for typically 118% 
of peak demand, and thus to pay whatever it takes to persuade adequate capacity to be made 
available. The design of these capacity obligations has been fraught, given that the capacity 
should be encouraged to be most available when most needed, and that it should be 
deliverable to the consumers that need it. As customers can change their LSE, a secondary 
market in capacity obligations is necessary, and given the inelastic nature of demand (e.g. 
                                                 
8  See Newbery (2005a), Brunekreeft et al (2005) and the special issue of Utilities Policy (June, 2005) 
on Transmission Pricing. 
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118% of peak load), capacity prices are both volatile and potentially manipulable. Various 
modifications to meet these requirements and deal with market power problems continue to 
be discussed before FERC, including Reliability Options of the kind proposed for other 
markets as a way of both rewarding rarely-run plant while insuring consumers against high 
price spikes.9 
The pressure for electricity reform in the US has been driven largely by states with 
high electricity prices, with little enthusiasm from states enjoying low prices (not 
surprisingly, as market integration that encourages price convergence would benefit 
consumer/voters in the former but harm them in the latter). FERC’s role has been seen as an 
infringement on states’ rights, and the Californian melt-down of 2000-01 did nothing to 
inspire confidence in the ability of liberalised markets to deliver secure and reliable power. 
The August 2003 blackout that affected a wide swathe of the Northeast added more weight to 
opponents of liberalisation and caused FERC to draw back from making the SMD mandatory. 
Nevertheless, PJM continues to expand and adapt to new challenges, which include ensuring 
generation adequacy and more interconnecting transmission investment.  
The early days of deregulation were marked by a gradual adaptation of the rules of the 
game (grid codes, market rules, regulatory interventions) to an increasingly boisterous 
attitude to trading, made subsequently infamous by Enron. The initial over-enthusiasm for 
investment came too late to help California but the resulting price collapse, bankruptcies and 
market shake-out, not to mention litigation over the price of contracts signed under “duress” 
in California, made both companies and banks wary of financing new investment. That, and 
the regulatory restraints on high prices prompted by earlier market abuses have chilled the 
investment climate and necessitated capacity requirements or their equivalent. 
 
Lessons for Europe from the US experience 
The US may not provide a good regulatory model for generation investment but it faces the 
same challenges as the EU when it comes to transmission investment. Both the US and the 
EU face the same problem of integrating different dispatch areas whose transmission grids 
were designed to deliver power within area and not to facilitate least-cost dispatch over an 
entire continent. The problem with financing transmission investment is who should pay for 
interconnections between areas, whose construction has rather indirect and poorly priced 
benefits that are differentially distributed – improved reliability, lower reserve margins, and 
reduced market power. The US attempt at encouraging merchant investment (financed on the 
back of the revenue streams produced by nodal price differences) has been less successful 
than hoped, and tends to be undermined by regulatory investments taken for security or 
reliability reasons (and hence chargeable through the regulated transmission tariffs). As 
elsewhere, environmental opposition to unsightly pylons hampers needed investment, 
although the Californian shortage and the major 2003 black-out may have reduced such 
opposition somewhat.  
                                                 
9 See e.g. Perez-Arriaga et al (2001) and the report for Dutch electricity regulator by Vazquez et. al 
(2003). 
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The PJM model of nodal pricing seems particularly valuable for transmission pricing 
and investment as it solves the “seams” issue (or the problem of paying for interconnection 
between dispatch areas) and appears to be a model that can be extended gradually over 
geographic space, although it leaves the major issue of complete recovery of total 
transmission costs unsolved. Europe is still some way from embracing the nodal pricing 
model, perhaps because it sits too comfortably with an interventionist approach to pricing and 
market power mitigation, with all the compensating regulatory rules and devices needed to 
offset the objectionable effects of local market power. As the US wrestles with market and 
regulatory design issues, her experience will continue to be useful, if carefully interpreted, for 
the European debate. 
 
Britain: addressing market concentration and adapting market design 
Newbery (2005b) outlines the history and experience of the exemplar of electricity 
market reform, contrasting the effects of the different models chosen in England and Wales 
(ownership unbundling of transmission) and Scotland (which retained the two vertically 
integrated companies). Britain provides the longest experience of European liberalisation and 
restructuring and therefore an important source of lessons. More to the present point, she 
provides a natural experiment for the choice of wholesale market design.  
The first lesson one can draw from the British experience is that unbundling 
ownership of transmission from generation has been critical in enabling competition to 
deliver cost reductions in England and Wales, in contrast to vertical integration in Scotland 
where there appeared to be no improvement in efficiency after privatisation (summarised in 
Newbery, 2005b, drawing on work of Newbery and Pollitt, 1997). 
 The original Electricity Pool (a centrally dispatched compulsory day-ahead half-
hourly market with a capacity payment) was set up in 1990 at the date of privatisation and 
restructuring. Generators submitted a single supply function one day ahead for each 
generating unit with five shape parameters (start-up costs, no-load cost, and three incremental 
costs) as well as a large number of technical details (minimum load, ramp-up rates, etc). The 
unit’s offer would remain valid for the whole set of 48 half-hourly periods starting at 
midnight the next day. The System Operator (National Grid Co) then found the system 
marginal price (SMP) for each half-hour (paid to all units called on to generate) as the most 
expensive bid accepted, ignoring transmission constraints. A payment for capacity declared 
available (and thus subject to dispatch) was added to the SMP to give the Pool Purchase 
Price, and a further charge for ancillary services was added to give the Pool Selling Price.10 
These prices and dispatch instructions were published at 5pm the day ahead.  
                                                 
10  The Capacity Payment was equal to the Value of Lost Load (VOLL) less SMP (or bid price) times 
the Loss of Load Probability (LOLP), providing strong incentives to be available when the system is 
tight. A large fraction of revenue from capacity payments thus are earned in a small number of hours 
in the year. Ancillary services include the cost of resolving transmission constraints where plant that 
must run is paid its bid price and plant backed down is paid the difference between the SMP and its 
bid (i.e. its lost profit). 
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 In addition to the Pool, which acted both as a commodity spot market producing the 
reference price and a balancing market, most generators and suppliers signed bilateral financial 
contracts for varying periods to hedge the risk of pool price volatility.  The standard contract was 
a Contract for Differences (CfD) which specified a strike price (£/MWh) and volume (MWh), 
and was settled with reference to the pool price, so that generators were not required to produce 
electricity in order to meet their contractual obligations. These CfDs could be one or two-sided, 
offering different hedging possibilities.11 
The initial market structure in England and Wales was highly concentrated, with two 
fossil generators setting the price over 90% of the time. One of the most useful lessons from 
the British experience is how market power manifested itself and how the regulator dealt with 
these problems. Although the two price-setting companies kept prices lower than might have 
been expected given their dominance, they clearly had and exercised market power, 
increasing the price-cost margin steadily as vesting contracts expired. In response, the 
generators agreed with the regulator to accept a wholesale (annual average) price cap in 1994 
until they found an acceptable way to reduce their market power, which they did by divesting 
6,000 MW to a third company in 1996. This did not reduce the price-cost margin, but the 
attempt of generators to vertically integrate into distribution and supply (to hedge wholesale 
price risk) required approval from the Competition Commission. This approval was 
effectively conditional on further divestiture, so the dominant generators traded horizontal 
market power for vertical integration into supply. 
 
The New Electricity Trading Arrangements replace the Pool 
The failure of the price-cost margin to fall, and a belief that the Pool was both 
manipulable and hard to modify, lead to a review of trading arrangements. In 2001 the Pool 
was replaced by the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA). NETA involved self-
dispatch, voluntary bilateral and OTC markets for contracting, combined with a pay-as-bid 
average priced balancing mechanism (described below) and no capacity payment. While the 
US was converging under FERC’s Standard Market Design (SMD) on the pool model (with 
the addition of nodal pricing), Britain abandoned that model and moved more closely towards 
the dominant European model of decentralised trading through power exchanges (such as the 
Amsterdam Power Exchange and the EEX).  
In the run-up to NETA, continuing plant sales were encouraged by the anticipation 
(not shared by foreign buyers) that excess entry induced by earlier concentration and high 
prices would likely undermine the high-price equilibrium, while the uncertainty surrounding 
the consequences of removing capacity payments in the forthcoming NETA increased the 
attraction of acquiring sticky domestic customers and selling risky generation. This lead to a 
remarkably unconcentrated industry shortly before NETA went live in March 2001, and with 
it the inability of the generators to sustain high price-cost margins. Prices collapsed towards 
                                                 
11  Over time the market developed quite sophisticated hedging instruments, for example hedging 
against prices above a specified strike price for the six most expensive half-hours in a month. The 
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the end of 2000, demonstrating that market power and high prices were the result of market 
structure rather than market design, although poor market design could certainly amplify 
existing market power. Plant withdrawal and rising fuel and carbon prices subsequently 
increased real wholesale prices to their pre-NETA level, although margins were still 
somewhat below entry level as of mid 2005.12  
 
Can market design address problems of market structure? 
The British example points to an apparent problem of determining whether unsatisfactory 
outcomes (high prices, manipulation of capacity payments, high payments for resolving 
transmission constraints) were a result of poor market design or poor market structure. The 
British evidence of increased wholesale competition suggests that where the market design is 
reasonably sensible (as under the Pool, which although flawed could work quite well in 
competitive conditions), then market structure is determinative.13 The exercise of potential 
market power is moderated by the nature and extent of regulatory scrutiny and the reputation 
and powers of the competition authorities, and probably also whether ownership is public (as 
in France and Norway) or private. While Britain has coped very well with wholesale market 
power, ending the domestic franchise and removing regulation from the retail supply margin 
has exposed households to considerable increases in those margins, as switching costs appear 
significant, and vertically integrated companies have been effective in exploiting their power. 
This message comes out in the evidence from the Nordic countries discussed in the next 
section. 
One issue that continues to attract debate and which remains unresolved is whether 
capacity payments are necessary to ensure security of supply, or whether they offer additional 
scope for market manipulation without enhancing security. Newbery (1995) demonstrated 
that the specific design of capacity payments under the Pool were manipulable if generators 
had a high enough market share (typically more than 25%, depending on contract positions). 
One logical alternative to capacity payments is to charge the TSO with ensuring security of 
supply (specified by a target frequency of loss of load, e.g. load shedding through inadequate 
capacity not more often than once every ten years). 14 
                                                                                                                                                        
ability of the market to devise suitable hedges is relevant to the discussion whether regulators should 
insist on Reliability Options to protect consumers and reward rarely-run plant (Vasquez et al, 2002). 
12  Fossil electricity generators have required CO2 emission allowances equal to their annual emissions 
since January 2005, and the price of these allowances has risen from €7/tonne CO2 to €22/tonne in 
mid June 2005. The June price would increase the cost of coal-fired generation by €20/MWh and of 
gas by nearly €10/MWh. While there are provisions for the free allocation to existing facilities and 
new entrants, investors face risks about the allocation methods in future periods. 
13  Evans and Green (2005) demonstrate econometrically that the while the reduction in concentration 
had a significant effect on wholesale prices, the switch from the Pool to NETA did not. 
14  There is another related set of issues whether it is better to specify security in quantitative terms 
(such as the size of the reserve margin) or whether security should be valued (as the value of lost load) 
and balanced against the cost. The same issue arises repeatedly in liberalised markets when assessing 
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The British experience is helpful in demonstrating the effectiveness of well-designed 
incentives for the monopoly TSO function. With such incentives the TSO can choose to 
contract ahead for reserves and run a balancing market or mechanism to provide real-time 
scarcity prices that can then feed back into spot and contract markets. The evidence from 
June 2003 (when winter scarcity was first forecast and forward prices started to increase) 
suggests that market signals can indicate ahead of time when plant needs to be brought back 
onto the system. There are remaining doubts whether these prices will signal when new plant 
needs to be built in enough time, but in practice large irreversible investment decisions are 
based on analysing market fundamentals, not just current trading views. 
The Balancing Mechanism implemented under NETA plays a key role in this price 
discovery process, and raises important design issues. There are several possibilities – to 
secure balancing bids and offers through a discriminatory auction (pay-as-bid, as under 
NETA) or a uniform or last price auction (e.g. as in the Netherlands), and whether to have a 
single imbalance price or two prices (for being short or long, as under NETA). Theory 
suggests a single imbalance price secured in a last price auction is the best competitive design 
but may not be the best choice in the presence of market power.  
NETA cost over €1 billion, created an arguably inefficient balancing market, and has 
reinforced the pressure for vertical integration which leads to lower market liquidity and 
hence barriers to (merchant) entry. This change in market design was premised on an 
inadequate cost-benefit study, and it is to be hoped that other countries will learn enough 
from the evidence it provides to avoid another costly design experiment. 
 
Transmission pricing 
Britain also developed a system of transmission pricing that is less than satisfactory, and is 
proving extremely difficult to reform. British transmission pricing has not therefore changed 
much since 1990, and continues to maintain the fiction that spot energy is equally valuable no 
matter where or when it is injected or withdrawn. Generators and consumers pay annual fixed 
charges that do depend on their location (by zones, of which there are 12-15) and their peak 
demand or capacity. Transmission losses are socialised. The TSO has to not only ensure 
energy balance but resolve transmission constraints by accepting offers to generate where 
there is inadequate supply and bids to reduce output where there is an export constraint. 
Again these constraint costs are socialised.  
The weakness of this method of transmission pricing is that, in contrast to the pre-
reform period, transmission losses are not borne by generators, distorting the merit order, 
while firm access rights reward, rather than penalise, generators in export constrained zones. 
Scotland is the obvious example, and two successive attempts by the regulator, Offer, to 
introduce transmission losses were successfully appealed against to the courts. Arguably the 
intentional complexity of NETA and its core Balancing Mechanism with two cash-out prices 
                                                                                                                                                        
transmission and other investments, and practice is only cautiously moving from an engineering-based 
to an economic approach. 
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prevented the logical reform to nodal pricing when the trading arrangements were changed, 
and that lost opportunity has also been costly. 
Britain has the advantage of a single TSO for the entire synchronised system, for 
Britain is only connected to other countries by DC links, and so it was reasonably 
straightforward to design a single system of transmission pricing to handle constraints and the 
resulting congestion when the industry was restructured in 1990.15 Other members of the EU 
are interconnected by AC interconnectors, and flows over these interconnectors depend on 
the entire pattern of injections and withdrawals at all the nodes or points at which generators 
or loads are attached. One of the key design issues is how such interconnected and 
interdependent systems will manage these power flows and handle congestion at the 
interconnectors. 
This system of uniform energy prices and zonal fixed transmission charges can be 
contrasted with locational marginal pricing (LMP), also known as nodal spot pricing, as 
practised in PJM and increasingly in other US jurisdictions, following the SMD. LMP fits 
naturally with a pool-based wholesale market (not necessarily compulsory) but there are 
concerns that individual nodal prices will be exposed to market power. Nevertheless, Green 
(2004b) estimates that nodal pricing rather than the British apporach of uniform pricing in the 
presence of market power would have raised welfare by possibly 1.8%, which is high 
compared to the gains of restructuring, which Newbery and Pollitt (1995) estimated as 
equivalent to a permanent reduction in prices of 5-6% in England and Wales. 
 
The Nordic Market: successful cross-border trading 
The Nordic system represents an intermediate and simpler solution to congestion 
management. Nord Pool uses the term market splitting (also called market coupling) to deal 
with the case in which constraints prevent the Nordic market clearing at a single price, in 
which case the market is split into pre-defined zones defined by countries or regions within 
countries. Each zone has a single market clearing price. This model is attractive where 
separate jurisdictions under different TSOs are again prepared to allow an SO to handle bids 
into the energy spot market and for using interconnectors to be cleared simultaneously. It 
appears to work with either a pool model or a power exchange (but it does benefit from a 
single SO to clear the bids and offers). 
Von der Fehr, Amundsen and Bergman (2005) offer evidence from the Nordic market 
on another critical issue for liberalisation – whether an unregulated generation and supply 
industry can survive the potential backlash from a period of high prices caused by shortage 
                                                 
15  Originally England and Wales had the National Grid Company (NGC) as the TSO, with the two 
Scottish vertically integrated companies trading in the Pool over the Scottish interconnectors, which 
they owned and managed. Since 2005 the whole of Britain has been dispatched by NGC under 
BETTA, the British Electricity Trading Arrangements. Although it is in principle easier to reach 
agreement about trading arrangements with a single national TSO, changes can have large 
redistributional impacts on generators and consumers and may be successfully opposed through the 
courts. That is one reason why losses are still socialised although this is clearly an unsatisfactory 
system. 
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(in this case of rain for the hydro reservoirs). Since the California meltdown of 2000/1 (also 
caused in part by low rainfall in the Columbia basin), observers have become sceptical that 
liberalisation will survive the honeymoon period of adequate reserve margins and resulting 
low prices. Norway provides an encouraging counter-example of regulatory and political 
forbearance and of the market response to unexpected price volatility.  
Both Norway and Sweden suffered from a supply shock in 2002-2003, due to 
unexpectedly dry weather. In the second half of 2002, inflow to hydro reservoirs was only 54 
per cent of the average of the preceding 20 year period. As a result, reservoir fillings were at 
a record low at the beginning of the low-inflow/high-demand winter season. Foreseeing 
tighter market conditions, producers began restricting supply in late autumn and prices started 
to rise. The (daily average) spot price peaked at 850 NOK/MWh (€115/MWh) in January 
2003, two to three times the normal level. High spot prices feed through to consumers, who 
in some cases faced increases in electricity bills of 50 per cent or more.16 There was 
speculation that high prices were the result of abuse of market power, as well as a lack of 
investment in both generation and transmission in earlier years, and that rationing on a 
massive scale would be required. As it turned out, no such drastic measures were warranted, 
as responses from consumers and thermal-power producers balanced the market. Even though 
prices remained high during most of 2003, market conditions gradually normalised.  
Some saw the events of 2002-3 as a warning sign, or indeed as outright proof that the 
electricity market is flawed. Others consider its performance through this period as evidence 
that the market has reached maturity and is robust enough to withstand even quite extreme 
shocks. Von der Fehr, Amundsen and Bergman preferred the latter view. Nevertheless, the 
supply shock brought to the surface a number of potential weaknesses that warrant careful 
analysis and which may eventually lead to further improvements in the regulatory framework 
as well as in other market institutions.  
Domestic prices increased rapidly as most Norwegian households bought at prices 
linked to the wholesale price (with a lag of only two weeks), in contrast to commercial and 
industrial consumers who typically bought on longer term contracts. Increases in end-user 
prices had a considerable impact on demand. Roughly speaking, Norwegian demand may be 
seen as consisting of three segments: the very flexible boiler segment (approx. 5% of the 
total), the heavily-contracted power-intensive industry (approx. 30%) and the rest (approx. 
65%).  Demand from the boiler segment – which can easily switch between oil and electricity 
– fell sharply when prices started to rise in October 2002 and remained low during the winter; 
all in all, electricity consumption by boilers over the period November 2002 to May 2003 was 
around one third of that of the corresponding period in 2001-2002. In the energy-intensive 
industries, some plants stopped production, but the overall response was relatively small, 
                                                 
16 Note that, since many Nordic consumers rely on electricity for most domestic energy needs, incl. 
heating, electricity bills tend to make up a considerable share of household budgets. For a typical 
Norwegian household, annual electricity consumption is around 20 MWh (compared to an average of 
3.6 MWh in Britain), while the annual bill would amount to around NOK 14,000 (approx. €1,700) at a 
price of 250 NOK/MWh. 
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probably less than 5 per cent. In the remaining segment – households and other industry – 
temperature-adjusted demand fell by 7 per cent over the November-May period compared to 
the year before; given an average increase in end-user prices of 30 per cent, corresponding to 
a price elasticity of 0.23. Both large amounts of electric heating and continuously high prices 
due to inter-temporal linkages from hydro plants are factors that can increase consumer 
response and are less pronounced in the rest of Europe. The experience in Norway may be 
contrasted with that of the other Nordic countries. Although wholesale prices moved more or 
less in parallel, retail prices were much less affected in these countries. This would seem to 
be explained by the fact that retail markets differ, particularly in the availability and 
composition of contracts, but also in market structure and the extent of competition. In 
Denmark and Finland, where fixed-price contracts dominate, domestic consumers were much 
less exposed to price increases than in Norway. In Sweden, there is a greater variety of 
contract types, although the incidence of long-term, fixed-price contracts is higher than in 
Norway. Moreover, there seems to be less competition among Swedish than among 
Norwegian retailers, and Swedish retail prices reacted much less than in Norway. As a result, 
the demand response was much less in these countries than in Norway. 
The creation of Nord Pool and the elimination of border tariffs between the Nordic 
countries were key elements in a strategy aiming at an integrated Nordic market for 
electricity. The success of this strategy may be measured by the degree of wholesale and 
retail price equalisation between the different “price areas”.17 Obviously, an uneconomically 
large transmission capacity would be required if transmission constraints were to be 
eliminated, enabling wholesale prices to be equalised across all areas at all times. However, 
significant and persistent deviations between area prices would imply that the Nordic market 
consists, in effect, of a set of national or regional electricity markets. 
The evidence presented demonstrates that the wholesale market appears to be strongly 
integrated, with prices in different areas diverging for short periods only. However, as 
mentioned above, retail market prices reacted very differently across the Nordic countries to 
the 2002-2003 increase in wholesale prices: while they shot up in Norway, the reaction was 
much more subdued in Sweden, and in Denmark and Finland retail prices hardly changed at 
all. There are also considerable differences in the level of retail prices, even when one 
corrects for differences in taxes and network tariffs. Some of these differences can be 
explained by differences in regulatory regimes. If one compares Norway and Sweden, where 
regulations are similar, the retail markets nevertheless seem to perform quite differently. 
Average retail prices were considerably lower in Norway than Sweden in the early period, 
                                                 
17 Whenever interconnector capacity constrains power flows, the Nord Pool market is divided into two 
or more “price areas”. Sweden is always treated as a single price area, and the same applies to 
Finland. This is because congestion in the national transmission systems is managed by means of so-
called counter-trade in these countries. In Denmark, the eastern and western parts of the country are 
physically separated and hence there are always two price areas – East and West. In Norway, 
segmentation of the market is part of the handling of transmission constraints and the country may be 
divided into two to five price areas, depending on the demand-supply configuration. 
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and the obvious explanation lies in the switching costs. Norway used profiles to determine 
bills while Sweden required expensive interval meters to switch to a new supplier until she 
moved to profiling in 1999, after which retail prices moved towards Norwegian levels. 
Nevertheless, there remain some concerns about price discrimination and market power in the 
Swedish retail market (as there do in Britain, where retail margins have widened considerably 
since the domestic franchise ended in 1999). 
The Nordic experience suggests that consumers can reduce demand appreciably in 
response to sustained increases in electricity prices, provided the wholesale prices feed 
through into retail prices and are not distorted by market power supported by high switching 
costs. When the reasons for high prices are clear and understood (low reservoir levels) there 
appears to be no need for regulatory intervention on the disastrous Californian model, 
although clearly poor market design in California prompted the need for some intervention. 
 
Germany: delayed regulation 
Brunekreeft and Twelemann (2005) discuss Germany, the heavyweight laggard of the EU 
reform process that has finally met the 2003 Directive requirement of a regulator. The new 
Energy Act entered into force on 13 July 2005, established a regulator, Budesnetzagentur, 
and implemented regulated third party access using some ex-ante, incentive-based approach 
to control network charges. Germany provides a fascinating example of the consequence of 
the failure to properly unbundle and regulate access to the natural monopoly transmission and 
distribution businesses, for their owners could collect profits in the monopoly segments while 
engaging in a margin squeeze in the competitive segments, deterring entry and facilitating 
mergers and increased concentration. This lack of Government concern with market power 
reached its nadir in 2002 when E.On (one of the two largest vertically integrated electricity 
companies) merged with Ruhrgas, the overwhelmingly dominant vertically integrated gas 
company.  
Although the Cartel Office prohibited the merger, the Minister of Economic Affairs 
overruled the Cartel Office (as well as his own advisors in the Monopolies Commission) and 
approved the merger. Gas is of vital importance as competitively supplied gas offers the 
prospect of a similar contestable entry price for gas-fired generation throughout Europe, 
reducing pressures on scarce interconnectors and allowing them to widen the effective market 
size, improving competition. Gas companies have also been the major entrants into electricity 
generation and supply competition, offering “dual fuel” deals to households. Removing that 
competition is therefore doubly damaging. Curiously, the European Commission did not 
claim any jurisdiction over the merger, despite its potential impact on electricity and gas trade 
within the EU. This failure to appreciate the special circumstances favouring tacit collusion 
and the exercise of market power in energy markets has set the process of creating a 
competitive electricity market back significantly.  
Germany has four control areas as a result of vertical integration and earlier 
consolidation, each with its own balancing market, whose designs Brunekreeft and 
Twelemann (2005) argue are flawed and manipulable. They hope that once a regulator is in 
place, these design flaws can be addressed and the markets better integrated. A recurrent 
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theme of the SESSA contributions is that balancing markets are often at the centre of good 
systems operation and integration, and reforms here might offer the prospect of incremental 
improvements in market integration that can be addressed largely at a technical and 
regulatory level. Unbundling is particularly important for allowing this process to work. 
The old system of cost-based regulation with high security standards encouraged 
excessive investment in generation, while the rather generous feed-in tariffs continue to 
encourage rapid investment in wind energy. Post-liberalisation entry of conventional 
generation has been disappointing. While this may reflect capacity adequacy and the rather 
low wholesale prices it is likely to change as  about 20 GW of nuclear power is due to be 
phased out over the next 20 years. There is already a proposal to start building a 2,100 MW 
lignite-fired thermal station by RWE in late 2005.18The authors also note that the way in 
which the European Emissions Trading System (ETS) will operate in Germany may 
effectively subsidise entry and facilitate both reserve adequacy and possibly market 
contestability. Recent forward prices of electricity have responded to the ETS carbon price, 
although not as fully as in Britain. Thus the forward dark spread for 2006 (the margin 
between the cost of coal in electricity generation and the value of the electricity produced) 
had risen from its earlier range around €8/MWh to nearly €19/MWh by mid 2005. Given that 
the carbon price itself accounts for about €20/MWh for coal, the residual forward dark spread 
to reward capacity for 2006 delivery was negative. Various interpretations are possible. First, 
the markets for fuel, electricity and emissions were not yet efficiently integrated. Second, as 
future allowance allocations are still under negotiation, generation companies chose not to 
pass through the full opportunity cost of current allowances, as this would provide an 
argument against future free allocation. Third, generation companies may anticipate that 
prices of CO2 allowances may fall because they expect large sellers to enter the market. 
 
                                                 
18  Reported statement of RWE’s CFO Antonius Voss in Platts EPD 13 Apr 2005. 
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Spain: contractual solutions to market power 
Crampes and Fabra (2005) discuss the complicated evolution of the Spanish electricity 
industry from its formerly highly regulated and cross-subsidised form towards a more market-
oriented structure. The Spanish Electricity Market is organised as a sequence of markets: the 
day-ahead market, several intra-day markets that operate close to real time, and the ancillary 
services market. The day-ahead market, which concentrates most of the volume of trade, is 
composed of 24 hourly markets that clear once a day (in contrast to the English Pool where the 
same bids had to hold for the entire day). On the generation side, electricity producers submit a 
supply ladder of up to 25 price-quantity pairs per production unit, specifying the minimum 
price at which they are willing to produce each given quantity. The offers can also include 
several conditions such as ‘minimum income’, ‘indivisibility’, ‘load gradient’, and ‘scheduled 
shutdown’. The demand side (suppliers and eligible consumers who choose to participate 
directly in the pool) submit a demand ladder specifying the maximum price at which they are 
willing to purchase a given amount of electricity. The demand functions can include up to 25 
price-quantity pairs.19  
 Once the supply and demand bids have been submitted, the market operator 
(Compañía Operadora del Mercado de Electricidad, OMEL) constructs a merit order despatch 
by ordering the supply and demand bids in ascending and descending order, respectively. The 
despatch and the equilibrium prices are determined through market clearing at the single 
market-clearing price – the market is thus a uniform-price auction like the English Electricity 
Pool. Although participating in the Pool is voluntary, capacity payments are only charged and 
made to participants, and the peculiar and discriminatory method of assignment of these 
charges and credits has discouraged bilateral contracting outside the Pool until recently, when 
eligibility has been extended to all consumers. The average capacity payment paid by 
consumers in 2004 was 4.81 €/MWh. Capacity payments are paid first to units in the so-
called “Special Regime” (mainly cogeneration and renewable energy) at 9.015 €/MWh. The 
residual amount of capacity payments is shared among the remaining production units, 
proportionally to their capacities (corrected by the unit’s availability rate in the current month 
and subject to some seasonality factors). Capacity payments do not thus differentially reward 
units available at times of system stress, as with the English VOLL-LOLP scheme.  
 The industry became more concentrated in the 1990s and by 2001 two firms (Endesa 
and Iberdrola) generated nearly 80% of output and also had about 80% of retailing. Although 
this level concentration is being gradually reduced, given this highly concentrated initial 
structure, left to their own devices the companies would doubtless have exercised 
considerable market power in the Pool. However, the generators were allocated a variant of 
contracts for differences – via the payment of Competition Transition Costs (CTCs), partly to 
recover stranded costs that would not otherwise have been repaid at competitive prices, and 
partly to ensure that incentives to bid much above competitive prices were restrained. As is 
                                                 
19 The distribution companies acquire the energy demanded by the consumers subject to regulated 
tariffs. Hence, they typically act as price takers and submit flat demand schedules at the price cap, 
18.03 c€/kWh. 
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well known, a fully contracted company would bid at marginal cost, but would for that reason 
typically not choose to be fully contracted. 
 The CTCs have limited the potentially serious market power of the duopolists in a 
period of resource scarcity, although providing somewhat perverse asymmetric bidding 
incentives into the Spanish pool. Iberdrola has a larger market share than its CTC contract 
share and so benefits from a rise in the spot price, while Endesa has a lower market share 
than its CTC share and benefits from a fall in the spot price, leading some observers to claim 
that the outcome was one in which the wholesale price was too low, deterring entry and 
penalising firms not covered by CTCs. 
 Spain has rapid electricity demand growth and high prices, so entry and imports 
would be desirable. For the past 15 years the logical augmentation of the interconnection 
capacity with lower-priced electricity in France has been successfully opposed, making local 
generation investment essential. Fortunately, the Spanish gas market structure with a number 
of entry points for LNG provides a similarly competitive market to that in the UK with its 
many entry points, and as in Britain, a dash for gas is emerging. For some time the Spanish 
and Portuguese authorities have been endeavouring to integrate the two systems to create an 
Iberian electricity market in which all Iberian generation would be able to compete, thus 
reducing market concentration, particularly in Portugal. To this end more interconnection 
capacity between the two countries is being built, but progress towards integrating systems 
operation is proceeding slowly, handicapped in part by the CTCs in both countries and the 
need to agree on some basic regulatory harmonization. 
 The Spanish Government has recently reviewed and criticised the CTC system. In 
November 2004 the Government invited Professor Perez Arriaga to prepare a White Paper on 
the electricity market, which delivered its report to on 26 July 2005.20 The White Paper 
proposes that the industry ministry sets limits on the amount of effective generation capacity 
any one company may control in the peninsular market. This might be achieved by plant 
divestiture, virtual power plant auctions (VPPs), following the French and Dutch approach 
described below, or long-term contracts or – whenever required - some kind of vesting 
contracts where both price and quantity are set by the regulator. The report notes that CTCs 
are distorting the market, and argues that the current Spanish system is “at crisis point.” The 
report suggests a number of possible solutions to the stranded cost problem that remove the 
incentive to distort bidding behaviour and would not impact the wholesale market price. 
Clearly the solutions and their working out in the market will offer interesting lessons for 
other concentrated markets (such as the Italian, French and Belgian markets).  
 Spain (and Portugal) illustrate the problems of liberalising a market after a period in 
which market concentration was if anything encouraged rather than prevented. Merger 
proposals, some of them obviously damaging to competition, continue to be made, but there 
is encouraging evidence that the competition authorities are becoming more aware of the 
damage that might be done, and some notable cases have recently been blocked. 
                                                 




The Netherlands: regulatory activism 
Van Damme (2005) describes the legally fraught process of liberalising the Dutch electricity 
market, which narrowly avoided the Government’s preferred option of a single national 
champion generating company.  The 1989 Electricity Act had a number of flaws and created 
perverse incentives, particularly in over-encouraging decentralised, mainly CHP, generation, 
which lead to over-capacity and inefficiency. The situation was unsustainable, and also 
incompatible with the Electricity Directive passed in 1996, which required a new Electricity 
Act that came into effect in 1998. This required legal (not ownership) unbundling of the 
networks and created a regulator (DTe) as a chamber of the competition authorities (NMa). 
The tariffs for the networks were now to be set using a price cap (RPI-X) but with the 
condition that final prices in 2000 were to be set equal to those prevailing in 1996. 
 Net imports accounted for about 16% of total consumption in 2001 and peak demand 
was estimated at about 16,000 MW. Import capacity was about 3,350 MW while domestic 
capacity was 20,400 MW (including some mothballed plant). Access to these interconnectors 
is through auction, year, month and day ahead, while power is traded in the Amsterdam 
Power Exchange (APX), including all power imported over the interconnectors (although 
those buying it abroad can buy it back by bidding at the maximum allowed price). The APX 
market-clearing price is found as the intersection of the offer and bid ladders for each hour 
and these schedules can be viewed on the APX web site the day ahead. Wholesale prices are 
higher than in neighbouring countries, and despite apparently strong interconnections that 
were auctioned long-term and day ahead, constraints have supported high interconnector 
prices.  
 There are four main generating companies (Electrabel, also the monopolist in 
neighbouring Belgium, with 33% of central capacity, Reliant, with 26%, Essent with 23% 
and E.On with 12%) connect to the high-tension grid, while about 30% of total capacity is 
decentralised (i.e. connected to the lower tension grids). These four companies are restricted 
in the amount of interconnection capacity they could contract to 200 MW each, and the NMa 
reported that the resulting HHI in 2002 was 1754, just below the 1800 mark taken to indicate 
a concentrated market in which further mergers may be problematic. 
 The four original generation companies had tried to merge earlier but could not agree, 
and considerable concentration had taken place in distribution companies (which was logical, 
given their often small size). In 2003, Reliant, a US company that had entered in 1999, 
decided to exit, and wished to sell to Nuon, which would then have created the largest 
generation company, raising the HHI to 1974. In contrast to Germany, the proposed Nuon-
Reliant generator merger was intelligently analysed with competent economic modelling (as 
described in van Damme, 2005), and the sensible remedy of a virtual power plant (VPP) 
auction for 900 MW was proposed.  The intention was to offer 90 blocks of 10 MW each 
offered at the marginal cost of the most recent plant (the Intergen CCGT). These VPPs could 
then be bid into the APX if required and would receive the market clearing price (if above the 
offer price, which might be this marginal cost or VPP strike price). The holders of the VPPs 
would thus earn a profit and would be willing to pay a premium into the VPP auction for the 
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right to this flow of profits. The underlying plant(s) would be operated by the merged 
company but they would not enjoy any operating profits. 
 The plan was to sell VPPs for five years in the first instance, but this was contested in 
the courts and reduced to one year at a time. One of the issues was whether an annually 
repeated VPP auction would encourage the seller to bid up APX prices to make the auction 
price higher shortly before each auction, and if so this temptation would be reduced by 
infrequent auctions for longer periods. Action design is a technical matter not always well-
understood by courts, but if VPPs are to be used as a method of mitigating market power this 
question is an important one to address (as is the choice between discriminatory and uniform 
price auctions in other markets). 
 In contrast to this sophisticated merger analysis, the price caps imposed in 1999, 
which had company-specific X-factors based on a benchmark analysis, were appealed to the 
courts, who narrowly and perversely interpreted the 1998 Electricity Law as requiring a 
single X-factor to apply to all companies. The Act has subsequently been redrafted to avoid 
this perversity, although using the courts rather than a more professionally competent dispute 
resolution authority (a role played by the Competition Commission in Britain) appears to be 
unsatisfactory. 
 The Act also had to be modified to enable the regulator to collect the kind of 
information needed for proper wholesale market surveillance, and even now there are 
difficulties in that the generation companies do not have the kind of licences that could 
contain conditions enabling the regulator to request market-relevant information. The 
Transmission System Operator, TenneT, clearly has access to much real time data, but 
appears not to have the authority to release commercially sensitive data to DTe. The 
Competition Authority could request such information if there were evidence of market 
abuse, but collecting such evidence without good reason is difficult. 
 Another major market design issue facing the Netherlands and neighbouring countries 
is how best to achieve closer market integration. This process would start with Belgium, but 
with the object of eventually making France, Benelux and Germany comparable to Nord Pool 
as far as pricing, dispatch and balancing services are concerned, with market splitting when 
constraints bind. Simulations suggest that the cross-border ownership (Electrabel in Belgium 
and the Netherlands, E.On and RWE spanning the Dutch-German border, in both cases 
owning transmission and interconnection) makes market integration more problematic. This 
again highlights the importance of acquisition and mergers that are viewed too narrowly in 
national terms, and over which the European Commission has taken too relaxed an approach. 
 Most central generation in the Netherlands is gas-fired, predominantly large gas-fired 
Steam and Gas or Combi plants, some of them combined heat and power (CHP) plants 
providing heat for district heating. Pricing gas therefore has a direct impact on the price of 
electricity, and has since liberalisation made the Netherlands more expensive than her 
neighbours. The gas market is concentrated, but efficient restructuring is impeded by 
ownership interests, not least of the Dutch Government. The gains from more complete gas 
liberalisation, not just for the Netherlands but across Europe, could be significant. 
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 Finally, DTe and the Government are concerned about security of supply and whether 
a liberalised energy-only market (such as the APX) can support adequate investment or 
whether capacity payments are needed. As in other countries, this issue remains unresolved.21 
 
France: reform retaining a state monopoly 
Finally, Glachant and Finon examine the curious case of French electricity reform “in which 
the state-owned monopoly was not privatised, demolished, or dismantled.” They consider the 
extent to which the competitive fringe (mainly of importers) can restrain the 800lb gorilla, 
EdF. Part of the problem of introducing effective competition in France is that she has a 
surplus of very low variable cost nuclear power, and little economic motive for new 
investment for the next decade. Whether a “privatised” EdF will exercise its undoubted 
muscles and induce entry, and whether the state-owned gas company GdF will provide 
effective retail competition and perhaps gas-fired generation competition or roll over and 
become part of EdF, remain questions for the future to answer. It may be that the French 
concept of privatisation (majority state-owned) allows EdF to continue its public service 
obligation to keep wholesale prices low (while charging domestic customers economically 
sensible Ramsey-Boiteux prices). This would maintain the status quo, but the rocky state of 
French public finances may make further privatisation and/or the exercise of market power to 
generate handsome dividends irresistible.  
 
The Lessons learned 
Competition requires that entrants can deliver power to consumers on the same terms as 
incumbents, and that requires non-discriminatory access to transmission and distribution, 
unbundled cost-based tariffs for their use, and no informational advantages to the incumbent. 
Vertically integrated transmission and generation companies can exploit informational 
advantages, discriminate in the provision of access, balancing and other ancillary services, 
and cross-subsidise competitive activities by inflating monopoly costs. British, US and 
German experiences demonstrate that vertical integration is a major impediment to efficient 
market access and also to inter-TSO trade.  
 
Unbundling and concentration 
Full ownership unbundling is the prize to strive for, and pressure from regulators and 
competition authorities should make this the least undesirable option for incumbents. If 
ownership unbundling cannot be negotiated, then the second-best alternative is an 
independent system operator (ISO), although it is harder to incentivise ISOs than TSOs with 
assets to bear the profit risk associated with any incentive regime. This seems to be more 
likely than the final option of regulatory and judicial pressure on vertically integrated TSOs 
to implement access and balancing arrangements that minimise consumer costs. If the ISO 
option is adopted, incentive regulation for transmission and distribution, ideally based on 
                                                 
21  See Roques et al (2005) for a discussion of security of supply. 
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benchmarks, is a demonstrated method of improving efficiency and reducing consumer costs, 
and, if well-designed, without prejudicing investment and security. 
Effective competition requires that individual generating companies are rarely pivotal 
(that is, essential for balancing supply and demand), which can be achieved by a combination 
of adequate spare capacity, sufficiently numerous generators or import capacity, and a 
competitive contract market, supported by free entry and non-discriminatory access to 
transmission and balancing services. Current market structures are often too concentrated to 
deliver competitive outcomes without close regulation, state ownership, or imposed contracts 
or equivalent schemes (such as the Spanish CTCs). Outside Nordel, interconnection is 
typically inadequate to address country-level concentration, and absent these conditions for 
competition, the choice of market design is unlikely to adequately mitigate market power, 
although some designs may facilitate collusion more than others.  
 
Wholesale market design 
The question of market design has a number of dimensions. Clearly it should be tailored to 
the circumstances of each country (ownership structures, fuel sources, and institutional/legal 
endowments and capabilities), but it should also facilitate a move towards a single EU-wide 
electricity market. The EU has been able to make remarkable progress in creating the 
preconditions for a liberalised and integrated electricity market through a sequence of 
Directives and Regulations, but these can only reflect current political consensus. Whereas in 
the US FERC as the federal energy regulator can encourage and cajole states to adopt a 
standard market design (SMD), Europe lacks such a regulator and relies on consensus and 
comitology for progress beyond the rather sparse details of the Directives. Progress on both 
sides of the Atlantic has been slow – states’ rights have similar salience to national 
subsidiarity. Creating markets which undermine impediments to market integration, perhaps 
starting with the regional integration of power exchanges (PXs), leading on to agreements 
among Transmission System Operators (TSOs) to integrate balancing markets to increase 
liquidity, might be more effective than political consensus-building. Liquidity and integrated 
balancing markets are both impeded by vertical integration and poor information sharing 
between TSOs. 
Among wholesale market designs, marginal single-priced pools have advantages in 
providing a reference price facilitating contracts and hence entry, and allowing scarcity-
responsive capacity payments (as in the former English Pool), but their transparency and 
repeated auction structure facilitate collusion if there are fewer than four or five comparable 
generation companies. Problems of gaming and collusion fall as the number of participants 
increases and the length of time for which bids must hold increases (so that bidding 
separately for each hour as in Spain or APX is likely to be inferior to bids that must hold for 
24 hours, as in the former English Pool).22 Power exchanges typically only trade 5-15% of 
                                                 
22  APX adopted the Spanish software that allows separate bids for each hour (and both power 
exchanges publish the aggregate supply and demand schedules for each hour). Bids are firm but in 
Spain they can be adjusted with new bids in the six intra-daily markets at four-hourly intervals. 
31/08/05 22
consumption in the prompt market, while forward bilateral contracts are either illiquid (if 
profiled) or inflexible (if restricted to base and peak power). In such cases liquid balancing 
markets are critical to competitive entry and supply. They may also be essential for security 
of supply in concentrated markets where the dominant incumbent is inhibited from investing 
(and further foreclosing the market) and entrants are deterred by the risks of illiquid, volatile 
and unpredictable balancing markets or mechanisms. 
 
Balancing markets and cross-border trade 
Balancing markets are therefore of central importance to promoting the European dream of 
market integration that delivers sustainable competition, and offer the prospect of breaking 
the log-jam of political consensus-building required to deliver mandatory Directives. While 
that process seems to have worked quite well for telecommunications with the 
Communications Directives emphasising regulation to address Significant Market Power, 
telecoms liberalisation is both older and more amenable to ex post regulation than electricity. 
Optimists believe that the process of introducing new Directives and Regulations has 
accelerated and will solve these problems; realists are sceptical. 
Agreement among TSOs (encouraged, supported and perhaps pressured by their local 
regulators) to exchange appropriate information and delegate balancing dispatch offers the 
prospect of creating liquidity first in the balancing or real-time market. Integrating balancing 
markets will reduce the required balancing volume, as some volatility cancels out, and will 
increase the number of competitors providing services in each market, thereby reducing 
balancing costs and encouraging trust in the balancing market. It may be that integrating 
balancing markets need to await the development of a well-functioning European day-ahead 
energy market, although progress is presumably more likely at a regional level first, again 
possibly following the improvement of day-ahead market integration. Again, vertically 
integrated TSOs might be reluctant to integrate balancing markets that allow more entry into 
their own wholesale markets and reduce generator or supply profits.  
Electricity markets are likely to be more conducive to tacit coordination than most 
other markets of comparable concentration, while non-storability and a low elasticity of 
demand amplifies market power, requiring a more informed approach to competitive analysis 
by regulators and competition authorities. Creating competitive gas markets, with gas-on-gas 
competition through liquid spot and balancing markets (as in Britain) offers the prospect of 
equilibrating the effective cost of the major electricity fuel across Europe, and hence reducing 
cross-border generation cost differences, reducing the need to trade and hence freeing up 
more interconnection for importing competition into otherwise concentrated markets (as in 
Nordel). 
Efficient trade requires efficient pricing and allocation of transmission, best achieved 
by nodal pricing on the PJM standard market design. The next best solution is market 
coupling. Local power exchanges would send their aggregate bid-offer curves to an 
international clearing stage, which would allocate transmission capacity between countries in 
a procedure similar to the synchronised auctions currently proposed by the European system 
operators. Local power exchanges would then schedule the corresponding international flows 
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and clear the local markets. This approach allows for netting and may work reasonably well if 
transmission within countries is adequate. Zones can be subdivided further if internal 
congestion levels increase. Again, access to full information is key to improving allocation 
and increasing available capacity, but requires trust that is best underlined by ownership 
unbundling or a regional ISO structure. Once that has been achieved, it might be sensible to 
revisit the appropriateness of the current technical transmission standards to see whether they 
are suitable for a decentralised and liberalised market. 
There are two arguments brought forward against this approach. The first is the likely 
reluctance of local PXs to create and join an international clearing house, which would 
largely undermine their own function (and similar progress for European stock exchanges has 
been woefully slow). The second problem is the existence of zones with adequate 
uncongested internal transmission. The Scandinavian example shows that a national power 
exchange can operate multiple internal zones, and liquidity in the exchange was apparently 
not adversely affected by subdividing the market. Liquid longer-term contracting may require 
the TSOs to issue financial transmission contracts as in PJM and other Northeastern US 
markets. 
There are also concerns about the problem of generation and transmission adequacy. 
Generation margins are getting tight in several European systems and there is widespread 
doubt that this issue could be left to energy-only markets, although this is still an open issue. 
Any move away from energy-only markets requires a choice between the alternative 
mechanisms that could be used, such as the LOLP scheme (which has some attractions but 
also critics), capacity payments, capacity obligations, etc. The CEER has issued a recent 
document on transmission investment, where the need to guarantee an adequate return on 
new investment (best achieved by running public auctions to build new lines, proposed by 
TSOs and authorised if needed by regulators) and full recovery via transmission tariffs was 
emphasized. The experience in the U.S. is that unless actively encouraged, adequate inter-
TSO transmission investment is most unlikely, while building any transmission in the teeth of 
local environmental objections is difficult, as the failure to complete the France-Spain 
interconnector demonstrates. 
A disagreeable implication of this is that market integration is likely to stall at the 
regional level, so that each region will remain largely isolated from the other regions. This 
might not matter too much if countries evolve similar fuel prices and make similar 
technology choices, as that will equilibrate electricity prices, arguably at lower financial and 
political cost than massive investments in interconnectors. 
 
Sustainability and emissions trading 
Finally, sustainability in the context of electricity markets has a further connotation in that the 
full environmental costs should be taken into account in investment and consumption 
decisions, so that the industry can evolve towards a low carbon future that does not prejudice 
the life chances of subsequent generations. This is recognised by the EU acceptance of the 
Kyoto targets and an EU commitment to market solutions to reflect the cost of greenhouse 
gas emissions. As the output of wind energy (the dominant source of renewable generation) 
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can only be accurately predicted a few hours before dispatch, it is important that market 
design does not create artificial barriers for such flexibility. This operational flexibility is of 
particular importance for transmission and it constitutes a new challenge in transmission 
network operation and design. An adequate design of balancing markets is crucial here. 
Market design and market structure should be used to minimise the exercise of market power 
in short-term (and ancillary service) markets which increase the costs of intermittent 
generation. Efficient use of international transmission capacity will allow international 
balancing and should further reduce intermittency costs. 
The aim of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is to equalise the price of 
carbon across the EU. If it is combined with a form of allocation that does not distort 
investment and operating decisions, the ETS should lead to the same cost increase for 
marginal electricity generation by each fuel in each country, and hence would not distort 
dispatch, trade or investment.  
The main concerns are to do with distortions arising from the system of allocating 
emission allowances. If emission allowances are contingent on continuing plant operation, 
they will discourage replacing inefficient high emissions plant by more efficient low emission 
plant. If future allowances are allocated on the basis of generation (kWh) in some countries 
(rather than capacity, kW) they could distort the marginal cost of operation in different 
countries and hence trade. If allowances are allocated by type of plant they could also prevent 
the desired change in the merit order towards lower carbon-intensive plant. Nevertheless, the 
ETS represents a considerable advance on more political and quota-based alternatives.  
 
The future 
Together the authors who contributed to this work package have used their country examples 
to raise almost all the main issues that need to be addressed when restructuring electricity 
industries to open up their markets. The next stage in Europe will involve full liberalisation of 
the accession countries, reforms to area-wide systems operation, transmission access and 
pricing, and the evolution of investment under the ETS. No doubt the electricity supply 
industry will continue to pose fascinating problems for energy economists to study and on 
which to offer guidance to the various regulatory authorities. 
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APX Amsterdam Power Exchange 
BETTA British Electricity Trading Arrangements 
CCGT Combined cycle gas turbine 
CEER Council of European Electricity Regulators 
CEGB Central Electricity Generation Board  
CHP Combined heat and power 
CTC Competition Transition Contracts 
DTe Dutch electricity regulator 
EC European Commission 
ESI electricity supply industry 
ETS Emission Trading System (for trading carbon dioxide) 
EU-15 The original 15 member states of the European Union 
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission  
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, = sum of squared percentage market shares 
ISO Independent System Operator 
LMP Locational Marginal Pricing 
LOLP Loss of Load Probability 
LSE Load Serving Entity (i.e. supply company) 
NETA New Electricity Trading Arrangements  
NGC National Grid Company, Britain’s TSO 
NMa Dutch competition authority 
NOK Norwegian Krone 
OTC Over the counter 
PJM Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland 
SMD Standard Market Design (SMD) 
SMP System Marginal Price 
SO System Operator 
TSO Transmission System Operator 
UCTE Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity 
VOLL Value of Lost Load  
VPP Virtual Power Plant 
 
